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Spinoza and the Mark of the Mental *
Martin Lin
A mind, according to Spinoza, is a state of a thinking substance.
The essence of a thinking substance is thought. And what is thought?
Spinoza is all but silent on this question.
To some extent, this silence is appropriate. Spinoza holds that thought is
an attribute of substance, which means that it is a fundamental way of
conceiving a substance. Because thought is fundamental, it does not admit
of metaphysical analysis; there is nothing more fundamental than thought
in terms of which such an analysis could be given. As Spinoza puts the
point in an early work, the Short Treatise, attributes “need no genus or
anything through which they might be better understood or explained: for
since they exist as attributes of a self-subsisting being, they too become
known through themselves.”1 In other words, it is impossible to give
a real deﬁnition – specify the essence – of an attribute because they are
understood through themselves.
But even where real deﬁnition is impossible, there can be alternative
forms of elucidation. That a concept represents something fundamental
does not mean that it bears no inferential relations to other concepts. Thus
we could be given a mark of the mental. Such a mark would consist of
necessary and suﬃcient conditions that, although falling short of a real
deﬁnition, nevertheless allow us to draw a line between the mental and the
non-mental.
The need for such a mark is suggested by Spinoza’s dialectical situa-
tion. Spinoza makes controversial claims about thought. For example,
his claim that thought is fundamental is denied by materialists such as
* I would like to thank Michael Della Rocca, Don Garrett, and John Morrison for comments on
a draft of this chapter. I am also grateful to audiences at the Department of Philosophy at the
University of Manitoba, the Finnish-Hungarian Seminar for Early Modern Philosophy, and the
South Central Seminar on Early Modern Philosophy for immensely helpful feedback on the ideas
contained in this chapter.
1 KV I 7 | G I 46–47.
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Hobbes. Furthermore, his claim that both thought and extension are
attributes of a single substance is rejected by substance dualists like
Descartes. Spinoza would claim that both Hobbes and Descartes are
misidentifying which phenomena are mental. For example, Hobbes errs
when he classiﬁes certain kinds of motions of extension as thoughts and
Descartes errs when he classiﬁes certain substances as non-thinking.
These disagreements are of a particularly radical sort. When Hobbes
claims that thought is a mode of extension, Spinoza regards him as
making a kind of conceptual error. When Spinoza says that a single
substance is both extended and thinking, Descartes similarly regards
Spinoza as making a conceptual error.
Although not every philosophically important notion must be
deﬁned or otherwise elucidated in order to make progress, it is easier
to proceed without such elucidation where there is general agreement
about the nature of the subject matter. But the nature of the mental is an
area where deep and pervasive disagreement obtains. Adjudicating these
disagreements in the absence of a mark of the mental would be diﬃcult,
if not impossible. Of course, this dialectical situation does not entail
that there is a mark of the mental. It only makes plain that it would
be desirable to have one and, consequently, worth our while to look
for one.
Spinoza never explicitly provides us with a mark of the mental. He
simply asserts that the essence of mind is thought and leaves it at that.
Likewise he asserts that the essence of body is extension without further
clariﬁcation. But this leaves open the possibility that such a mark can be
recovered from consideration of what Spinoza does say about the mind and
the attribute of thought. In what follows, I will consider several candidates
for the mark of the mental, either drawn from tradition or suggested by
Spinoza’s own text. I will argue that although Spinoza’s text is certainly
suggestive of some of them, on closer examination, each of them is
ultimately inconsistent with Spinoza’s explicit commitments. Although
this result is, in some respects, disappointing, I will further argue that
Spinoza’s metaphysics of mind and body entails that at most one of them
can be characterized explicitly. I will conclude by discussing what this
means for Spinoza’s philosophy of mind.
Characterizing the Mind
The mental as the cause of intelligent action. The mental has sometimes been
characterized as what explains intelligent action. Such a characterization
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can be extracted from Descartes’ Discourse on Method.2 According to
Descartes, certain eﬀects provide us with reasons to postulate a mental
state rather than a physical state as the cause. For example, if we observe
a creature competently using language or appropriately responding to
diverse novel situations with a high degree of ﬂexibility, then we have
reason to suppose that the cause of its action is mental rather than physical.
This is because there is, Descartes appears to presuppose, an explanatory
gap between mechanism and intelligent action. We cannot conceive of
a machine that could have such ﬂexibility. So, the cause must be non-
mechanical, which, Descartes assumes, means that the cause must be
mental.
This characterization of the mental is unavailable to Spinoza because he
denies mind–body interaction. Because intelligent action involves bodily
motion, Spinoza cannot allow that it hasmental causes. Why does Spinoza
deny mind–body interaction? The reason is that he believes that physical
events must be understood through physical causes andmental events must
be understood through mental causes. He holds this on the basis of two
putative facts: (1) causes and eﬀects must have something in common
and (2) there is nothing in common between mind and body. If mind
and body interacted, then physical events would be understood through
mental events and mental events through physical events. Consequently,
Spinoza denies interaction.
Spinoza’s denial of interaction pushes him to assert that there is no
explanatory gap between mechanism and intelligent action. According to
him, every intelligent physical action has a purely physical explanation,
understood in an objective metaphysical sense. Of course, in many cases
we have not discovered these explanations. But this simply reﬂects the
primitive state of our knowledge or perhaps indicates our cognitive
limitations. The appearance of an explanatory gap is thus explained by
our ignorance. As Spinoza puts it, “We know not yet what the body can
do.”3 The optimistic “yet” in this formula suggests that Spinoza believes
that mechanistic science will eventually uncover such explanations.
Although Spinoza is sometimes more cautious about the limits of human
knowledge, it is nevertheless clear that he has no doubt that such explana-
tions are possible, at least in principle.
The mental as the exempliﬁcation of a distinctive causal structure. Perhaps
Spinoza’s denial of mind–body interaction suggests a diﬀerent character-
ization of the mental in causal terms. Consider the claim that something
2 AT VI 56–60 | CSM I 139–141. 3 E3p3s.
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is mental just in case it has causes and eﬀects that are themselves mental.
There is no doubt that Spinoza believes this, but as a characterization of
the mental it would be viciously circular. If we are seeking to clarify the
concept of the mental, then it will not help to be told that the mental is
what has mental causes and eﬀects.
But causal relations might serve to distinguish the mental from the
physical in a diﬀerent way. The mental and the physical might be distin-
guished in terms of causal structural properties. Causal structure is what
remains when we abstract the causal relations away from those things that
they relate. The physical could then be, for example, the realm that
exempliﬁes causal structure S whereas the mental would be the realm
that exempliﬁes a diﬀerent causal structure S*.
A criterion based on diﬀerent causal structure is suggested by certain
interpretations of Descartes according to which the mind has genuine
causal powers of its own whereas the body is causally inert and is, at
most, only an occasional cause.4 Thus mind and body are distinguished
by diﬀerent causal structural properties.
Although it succeeds in avoiding circularity, the causal structure
characterization of the mental will not work for Spinoza because of his
parallelism doctrine.5 The parallelism consists of three claims: (1) For every
mode of extension there is a mode of thought that represents it; (2) for
every mode of thought there is a mode of extension represented by it;
(3) the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connec-
tion between things. “Order and connection” includes causal structure.
The mental realm and the physical realm are thus identical with respect to
causal structure and thus no characterization of the mental for Spinoza can
appeal to causal structure.
Simplicity as the mark of the mental. Plato, in his Phaedo, famously
claims that the soul is simple.6 It does not have parts. This claim of
simplicity is widely inﬂuential and is held by many subsequent philoso-
phers, including Descartes, who argues in the Meditations for
mind–body dualism on the basis of the claim that the mind is simple:
The body has parts. The mind does not have parts. Therefore, the
mind is distinct from the body.7
Spinoza, however, rejects the simplicity of the mind. Indeed, he denies
its simplicity for reasons closely related to the ones we considered in
4 See, e.g., Garber, “HowGod CausesMotion” and “Descartes andOccasionalism,” both of which are
collected in Garber’s Descartes Embodied. I’m grateful to Helen Hattab for bringing to my attention
the connection between this putatively Cartesian criterion and the causal structure criterion.
5 E2p7, E2p7d, and E2p7s. 6 Phaedo 78b–79e. 7 AT VII 86/CSM II 98.
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connection with causal structure. For Spinoza, causal structure determines
mereological structure. Consider the following text:
Deﬁnition: When a number of bodies, whether of the same or of diﬀerent
size, are so constrained by other bodies that they lie upon one another, or if
they so move, whether with the same degree or diﬀerent degrees of speed,
that they communicate their motions to each other in a certain ﬁxed
manner, we shall say that those bodies are united with one another and
that they all together compose one body or Individual, which is distin-
guished from the others by this union of bodies. (Def. after 1p13s)
According to this text, part–whole relations are determined by causal
relations. It says that for any collection of bodies, these bodies are parts
of a whole just in case (1) other bodies force them to move together or
(2) if one of them moves, then its motions are communicated to the
others according to a stable pattern. These causal relations, forcing and
communicating, must have a parallel under the attribute of thought
because the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and
connection of bodies. In virtue of these parallel causal relations, Spinoza
concludes that:
The idea that constitutes the formal being of the humanMind is not simple,
but composed of a great many ideas. (2p15)
Mereological structure cannot, therefore, serve to distinguish the mind
from the body.
Consciousness as the mark of the mental. Another popular candidate for
the mark of the mental also originates with Descartes: consciousness.
When Descartes tries to explain what the various modes of thought
(belief, volition, imagination, sensation, etc.) have in common, he says
that they are such that we are immediately conscious of them.8 Thus all
thoughts are immediately conscious. Moreover, only thoughts are
immediately conscious. Although we are aware of bodies, including
our own, our consciousness of them is mediated through sensory
thoughts.
Does Spinoza have an account of consciousness and, if so, what is it and
can it serve to distinguish the mind from the body? There is some
controversy surrounding these questions. If, as some commentators
believe, Spinoza has no theoretically serviceable notion of consciousness,
then appealing to the notion in characterizing the mental will be of little
8 Principles I.9, AT VIII-A7, and Second Replies, AT VII 160.
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use and we need not consider the matter further.9 There are commentators,
however, who believe that Spinoza does have a theory of consciousness.10
In order to assess this claim and determine whether, if true, it could
provide Spinoza with a mark of the mental, we have to look more closely
at the issue. The most promising interpretations focus on the following
two texts:
In proportion as a body is more capable [aptius] than others of doing many
things at once, or being acted upon in many ways at once, so its mind is
more capable than others of perceiving many things at once. And in
proportion as the actions of a body depend more on itself alone, and as
other bodies concur with it less in acting, so its mind is more capable of
understanding distinctly. (E2p13s)
Because human bodies are capable [apta] of a great many things, there is no
doubt but that they can be of such a nature that they are related to minds
which have a great knowledge of themselves and of God. . . .Hewho, like an
infant or child, has a body capable of very few things and very heavily
dependent on external causes, has a mind which considered solely in itself is
conscious [conscia] of almost nothing of itself, or of God, or of things.
On the other hand, he who has a body capable of a great many things, has
a mind which considered only in itself is very much conscious of itself, and
of God, and of things. (E5p39s)
The ﬁrst text says that the mind perceives many things in proportion to the
body’s ability to do many things simultaneously or to be acted on in many
ways at once. The connection between perception and a passive capacity to
be acted on is clear enough. Compare a raven to a writing desk. Sound
waves propagating through the air don’t make any appreciable diﬀerence
to the state of the writing desk, but the waves do introduce vibrations in the
eardrums of the raven and subsequently change the state of its auditory
nerves and the state of its brain. The raven’s greater capacity to be acted on
is directly related to its capacity to perceive many things. But what is the
basis of the connection between the ability to do many things and to
perceive many things? At minimum, a body has to have the ability to be
altered by environmental inputs while maintaining the pattern of motion
and rest that deﬁnes it. This requires, for Spinoza, internal actions that
respond to environmental inputs in a pattern-preserving way. Thus the
9 See Bennett, A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics, pp. 184–191; Della Rocca, Representation and the Mind-Body
Problem, p. 9; Matson, “Spinoza’s Theory of Mind,” pp. 568–578; and Miller, “The Status of
Consciousness in Spinoza’s Concept of Mind,” pp. 203–222.
10 See Garrett, “Representation and Consciousness in Spinoza’s Naturalistic Theory of Imagination,”
pp. 4–25; Nadler, “Spinoza and Consciousness,” p. 575.
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kinds of passive capacities that result in perception rather than destruction
are directly correlated with active powers.
The second text says that the more bodies are capable of, the more their
associated mind is conscious of itself, God, and the world. What explains
the correlation between capabilities and consciousness? Don Garrett has
interpreted these texts as identifying consciousness with an idea’s causal
power. This identiﬁcation elegantly explains the correlation between
power and consciousness. Steven Nadler develops a similar interpretation.
But instead of identifying consciousness with causal power, he identiﬁes it
with the categorical basis of the power of an idea, which, according to
Nadler, is its structural complexity.
If either of these two interpretations is correct, then consciousness
cannot, for Spinoza, serve to distinguish the mental from the physical.
Spinoza is clear in these texts that the power of an idea is proportional to
the power of the body to which it corresponds, and it is strongly suggested
by his claim that the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order
and connection of bodies. The only diﬀerence between the powers of
a body and the powers of its idea would be that the body has the power
to produce physical eﬀects and its idea has the power to produce mental
eﬀects.
But this cannot provide us with a non-circular characterization of the
mental. Thus if Garrett is correct and consciousness is grounded by causal
power, consciousness cannot be, for Spinoza, the mark of the mental.
We have already seen, moreover, that the mechanical structure of the
mind is isomorphic to that of the body. Thus if Nadler is correct and
consciousness is grounded by the categorical basis of causal power, which
he takes to be mereological structure, then consciousness cannot be, for
Spinoza, the mark of the mental.
Intentionality as the mark of the mental. It is sometimes said, most
famously by Brentano, that intentionality is the mark of the mental.
And indeed, there is much that suggests that this is Spinoza’s view.11 It is
certainly the case that, for him, every idea represents something.
The question remains, however, whether only ideas represent. Of course,
if intentionality is to provide the mark of the mental, we must distinguish
between the distinctive form of intentionality characteristic of the mental
from other forms of intentionality. After all, on the face of it, paintings,
11 That representation is the essence of thought is defended by Michael Della Rocca in his Spinoza,
pp. 89–90.
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books, speech acts, and other physical things also represent. Given this,
philosophers who think that intentionality is the mark of the mental
typically insist that there is some diﬀerence in the way mental and non-
mental entities represent. For example, the mental might represent
intrinsically while physical things represent only derivatively by being
used as a proxy for intrinsic intentionality.
There are, indeed, two kinds of intentionality for Spinoza. The ﬁrst kind
pertains to the relationship that obtains between ideas and the bodies to
which they are parallel and the second kind is causal/informational.
The ﬁrst kind of intentionality is intrinsic because it is a basic feature of
ideas that depends on no external conditions. The second kind is derivative
in that it depends on the causes of the intentional state and on the primitive
intentionality of the ﬁrst kind.
In what follows, I will ﬁrst argue that there is little reason to deny that
the causal/informational kind of intentionality can be a property of phy-
sical things and so cannot be the mark of the mental. I will then argue that
“intentional” relations between ideas and the bodies to which they are
parallel lack all of the features that have led philosophers to associate
intentionality with the mental, thus making it an unattractive candidate
for the mark of the mental.
Spinoza describes the causal/informational kind of intentionality
in 2p16 and 2p16c where he gives his account of sense perception. He
begins by asserting that a state of the body is determined both by the nature
of the body and by the natures of any external bodies aﬀecting it. Next, he
appeals to the principle, stated in 1a4, that the idea of an eﬀect involves and
depends on the idea of its cause. Thus the idea of a state of the body
involves and depends on the ideas of the natures of any external bodies
aﬀecting it. From this, he infers that “the Mind perceives the nature of
a great many bodies in addition to the nature of its own body.”12
What 2p16 shows is that, for Spinoza, a causal/informational link is
suﬃcient for a mental representation. What is more, for Spinoza, the
human being is deeply imbedded in a complex web of causation so that
none of its parts and their processes are independent of causal inputs from
the external world. For this reason, Spinoza concludes that all of our ideas
of the external world as well as our ideas of our own bodies and minds have
a causal/informational basis.
Nothing in this account prevents physical states from representing
or perceiving. Physical states involve the natures of their causes and
12 E2p16c1.
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thus contain information about them. Given the principles articulated
previously, physical states are perceptions of the natures of their physi-
cal causes. Thus, this kind of intentionality cannot be the mark of the
mental.
Now it may be objected that that causal/informational links only
determine what content an idea has, but not that it has content. That
an idea has content is solely determined by its status as a mode of
thought. Thus bodies, if they were to have content, would have whatever
content their causal/informational links would determine.13 But as
modes of extension and not modes of thought, they do not have content
at all. This may in fact be Spinoza’s view, but, although it makes
intentionality necessary and suﬃcient for thought, it does not appear
to make intentionality the mark of the mental so much as make the
mental the mark of intentionality. This is because it would distinguish
genuine intentional states from merely information-bearing states by
requiring the genuine intentional states to be mental. Once we have
analyzed intentional states as informational states that are additionally
mental, we have deprived ourselves of intentionality as a possible mark of
the mental. The very notion of the mental would lie too close to the
surface of the notion of the intentional to provide us with anything but
a viciously circular characterization.
The second kind of intentionality for Spinoza is one that relates every
idea to the body parallel to it in the order and connection of things.
This kind of intentionality cannot be the result of causal relations
because no causal relations obtain between an idea and the body parallel
to it. Spinoza gives no other account of what in virtue of which these
representational relations obtain, and so gives the impression that he
regards them as basic or fundamental. As such, they indicate a form of
intentionality that is a promising candidate for a mark of the mental:
something is mental just in case it represents some body by means of
basic or intrinsic intentionality.
But why can’t bodies represent intrinsically? Spinoza doesn’t have much
reason to deny that they can. To see this, consider the case of ideas of ideas.
Every idea, according to Spinoza, is represented by an idea. But, Spinoza
says, the idea that represents an idea is not a distinct idea, but rather it is the
idea itself. In other words, every idea is self-representing. Spinoza says that
the idea that represents a given idea is the form of that idea. The formal
reality of an idea can be considered its own objective reality. If ideas are
13 I owe this objection to John Morrison.
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allowed to represent themselves, why can’t bodies? Why can’t the formal
reality of each body contain itself objectively? Why can’t a table or a rock
stand for itself?
To see why this questionmight be considered a diﬃcult one for Spinoza,
let us consider the older conception of representation that was most
prominent in Spinoza’s day. On the model prevalent among the scholastic
Aristotelians, the soul is able to represent by virtue of receiving the form
without the matter of the objects being represented. When this happens,
the represented thing is said to exist objectively in the soul. Things without
souls cannot represent in this way because they are incapable of receiving
form without matter. But if something represents itself, there is no need
to receive the form without the matter. The form already exists in the
thing, together with its matter. So why can’t extended things represent
themselves?
Of course, Spinoza can answer that it is of the nature of thought to have
an object, and not in the nature of extension. But, in what follows, I will
argue that such an answer is unsatisfying because a closer examination of
intrinsic intentionality as Spinoza conceives it reveals that it has none of the
characteristics that have led philosophers to associate it with mentality. Let
us consider them in turn.
• The intentional object of the idea may not exist.
It is commonly believed that I can think about, for example, Pegasus even
if there is no such thing as Pegasus. The intentional objects of thought need
not exist outside the mind. But the ability to be directed at something
nonexistent seems like a very special sort of ability and one not possessed by
something merely physical.
Spinoza, however, denies that the intentional object may not exist.
The idea of x exists only so long as x exists. He writes:
From this it follows that so long as singular things do not exist, except
insofar as they are comprehended in God’s attributes, their objective
being, or ideas, do not exist except insofar as God’s inﬁnite idea exists.
And when singular things are said to exist, not only insofar as they are
comprehended in God’s attributes, but insofar also as they are said to have
duration, their ideas also involve the existence through which they are
said to have duration. (E2p8c)
If an idea existed without the body it represents existing, this would be
a violation of the parallelism doctrine that requires a body for every idea.
To be sure, Spinoza says that the mind is not entirely destroyed when the
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body dies and something eternal remains. But the eternal part of the mind
represents the eternal part of the body: its formal essence. So this does not
break the link between intentionality and the existence of the represented
object.
It is true that Spinoza says that often we regard things that do not exist as
present.14 But his account of this is in terms of informational states. When
we are aﬀected by an external cause, this puts our body into a state that
contains information about that external cause and thus we perceive it.
We will continue to be in that state until we are aﬀected by another
external cause that puts us into a state incompatible with the ﬁrst state.
So, for example, if light is reﬂected oﬀ the surface of an apple and it
subsequently irradiates the retina of my eye resulting in a certain brain
state that contains information about the apple, I will continue to represent
the apple until my brain is no longer in a state that contains information
about it, even if the apple itself no longer exists. The apple may be
destroyed after I perceive it, but if this event has no causal connection to
my brain, I will continue to be in a brain state that represents the apple by
containing information about it. But as we have seen, this kind of repre-
sentation cannot be a mark of the mental because there is little reason to
suppose that physical states cannot represent in this way.
• The idea can point to an object distinct from itself.
It is sometimes thought that only the mental has the power to point
intrinsically. That is to say, only the mind can have the intrinsic power
to be about something else. Put like this, the claim might appear vague and
uninformative. But regardless of how we might more precisely formulate
it, it will not help Spinoza explain the diﬀerence between the mental and
the non-mental. For Spinoza, in the case of intrinsic intentionality, the
object must be identical to the idea of it. To the extent to which the mind
can be about something external, it must be about it in the informational
sense described earlier and, we have seen, there is no reason to deny that the
body too has this power.
• The intentional has satisfaction conditions.
It is sometimes thought that only the mental can have satisfaction
conditions intrinsically. There are diﬀerent kinds of satisfaction conditions
corresponding to diﬀerent kinds of attitudes toward the intentional
object. Beliefs have truth conditions. Desires have fulﬁllment conditions.
14 2p17c, 2p17cd, 2p17s, 2p44s.
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For Spinoza, belief is associated with intellect and desire is associated with
the will.
Now Spinoza claims, rather strikingly, that the will and the intellect are
one and the same thing. By this he means that every mental representation
is at once like a belief and like a desire. This puts him at odds with
philosophers such as Descartes who claim that the mind contains two
very diﬀerent kinds of modes: perceptions and volitions.
On the Cartesian view, a perception is a representation. When
a perception is the subject of a certain kind of volition (call it aﬃrma-
tion), it becomes a judgment or a belief. When a perception is the subject
of a diﬀerent kind of volition (call it wanting), it becomes a desire.
The key here is that beliefs and desires are the result of two mental
modes, one that represents and another that provides an attitude toward
that representation. By claiming that will and intellect are one and the
same thing, Spinoza is denying that beliefs and desires are composites
of two kinds of mental modes, one representational and the other
volitional.
Furthermore, Spinoza also denies that there are any dedicated represen-
tational states associated with desire. To see this, we need to look more
closely at Spinoza’s theory of desire and aﬃrmation. Spinoza’s account of
the conatus or striving for self-preservation that he says animates all of
nature and that accounts for both aﬃrmation in judgment and desire.
Spinoza says:
Each thing, insofar as it is in itself (quantum in se est), strives (conatur) to
persevere in its being. (E3p6)
This is a perfectly general phenomena that is true of every mode of
extension and thought no matter how simple or complex. As manifested
by human beings, this striving is will, appetite, and desire. Spinoza writes:
When this striving is related only to theMind, it is calledWill; but when it is
related to the Mind and Body together, it is called Appetite. This Appetite,
therefore, is nothing but the very essence of man, from whose nature there
necessarily follow those things that promote his preservation. And so man is
determined to do those things. Between appetite and desire there is no
diﬀerence, except that desire is generally related to men insofar as they are
conscious of their appetites. So desire can be deﬁned as appetite together
with consciousness of the appetite. (E3p7)
The conatus also explains the behavior of all things. By their very nature
(quantum in se est), they perform those actions of which they are capable
that help preserve their being or existence. Thus, according to Spinoza,
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every action performed by a human being is directed toward self-
preservation.
What is true of human beings is also true of their parts. The simpler
ideas that constitute the mind also strive for self-preservation. Each idea
is disposed to produce actions that conduce to the preservation of the
mind. The representational content of the idea enters into the causal
story because the actions that every idea is disposed to produce are those
that conduce to self-preservation on the condition that the content of
the idea is accurate. In this sense, every idea contains an aﬃrmation of its
content and thus every idea is belief-like. What is more, because every
idea strives for self-preservation, every idea manifests desire. Note that
the cause of an action is a single idea with a single intrinsic content,
which is always a state of the body. There is no intrinsic representation of
the future state aimed at by the actions produced by that idea. Thus there
are only intrinsic truth conditions associated with the representational
content of any idea and never any intrinsic satisfaction conditions such
as we would associate with desire. Moreover, the truth conditions
associated with any idea are always trivially fulﬁlled.15 This is because,
in virtue of the parallelism, an idea exists just in case its object
exists. Truth conditions that are always trivially fulﬁlled are satisfaction
conditions only in a very uninteresting sense. It is hard to see what the
point of postulating satisfaction conditions that are always automatically
satisﬁed could possibly be.16
Thus intrinsic intentionality, as Spinoza conceives it, has none of the
characteristics that have led philosophers to associate it with the mental.
For this reason, it seems unsuitable as a mark of the mental.
We have a distinctive kind of epistemic access to the mental. A view some-
times attributed to Descartes is that the diﬀerence between the mental and
the non-mental is the kind of epistemic access we have to the mental.17
This distinctive access is sometimes characterized in terms of introspection
and it is sometimes said that we have superior epistemic access to our own
mental states. Our knowledge of the mental is immediate, infallible, etc.
Could Spinoza distinguish the mental by means of diﬀerent epistemic
access?
I do not think that Spinoza posits an epistemic asymmetry between
mind and body, but I must also concede that there is some textual evidence
15 See Bennett, Learning from Six Philosophers, pp. 189–190.
16 For further discussion of Spinoza’s account of judgment, see Della Rocca, “The Power of an Idea,”
pp. 200–231; Lin, “Spinoza’s Account of Akrasia,” pp. 401–404.
17 Ryle, The Concept of Mind, pp. 3–5; Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, pp. 54–60.
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that suggests one. I will ﬁrst review this evidence and then explain why it
should not be read as asserting an epistemic asymmetry.
If Spinoza believes there is an epistemic asymmetry between mind and
body, it is not the usual one according to which knowledge of the mind is
more direct than knowledge of the body. Rather, the textual evidence
sometimes appears to suggest that our knowledge of our minds is mediated
by knowledge of the body. Consider, for example, the following text:
However, we also cannot deny that ideas diﬀer among themselves, as the
objects themselves do, and that one is more excellent than the other, and
contains more reality, just as the object of the one is more excellent than the
object of the other and contains more reality. And so to determine what is
the diﬀerence between the human Mind and the others, and how it
surpasses them, it is necessary for us, as we have said, to know the nature
of its object, i.e., of the human Body.18
Here Spinoza says that the excellence of ideas is proportional to the
excellence of the bodies that they represent. For this reason, in order to
know the excellence of the human mind, we must know the object of the
mind, viz., the body. This can be read by the proponent of epistemic
asymmetry as suggesting a diﬀerence in epistemic priority. First know the
body and then, on the basis of that knowledge, know the mind. That this is
Spinoza’s intended meaning is further suggested later in the Ethicswhen he
writes: “The mind does not know itself, except insofar as it perceives the
ideas of the aﬀections of the body.”19
The proponent of asymmetry could also discern intimations of such
a doctrine in Spinoza’s early work the Treatise on the Emendation of the
Intellect, where he writes, “there is no idea of an idea unless there is ﬁrst an
idea.” That is, there are no second-order mental representations, mental
representations of mental representations, without ﬁrst-order mental
representations, which are in some sense prior to them. First-order mental
representations are, for Spinoza, always representations of bodies.
Moreover, we have no non-representational mental states. Thus follows
Spinoza’s conclusion that there are no mental representations of our minds
without mental representations of our body, which are, in some sense,
prior to them. In other words, knowledge of the body is prior to knowledge
of the mind.
Despite this suggestive textual evidence, it is far from clear that Spinoza
really does think that knowledge of the body is prior to knowledge of the
18 E2p13s. 19 E2p23.
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mind. First of all, only the early unﬁnished and unpublished Treatise on the
Emendation of the Intellect contains any explicit mention of priority. And
even there, the topic under discussion is not the epistemic priority of the
body per se, but rather the acquisition of method and so it is permissible to
doubt how much weight ought to be given to Spinoza’s statement in the
present context. Both texts from the Ethics cited previously make no
explicit claims about epistemic priority. 1p13s says only that “And so to
determine what is the diﬀerence between the human Mind and the others,
and how it surpasses them, it is necessary for us, as we have said, to know
the nature of its object, i.e., of the human Body.” This can be read as
merely stating some kind of entailment: necessarily, if we determine the
diﬀerence between the human body and others, then we know the human
body. Likewise for 2p23, which could also be read as merely asserting an
entailment: necessarily, the mind knows itself if and only if it perceives
aﬀections of the body. But an entailment relation does not by itself make
for priority. After all, every proposition entails itself and none is prior to
itself.
Indeed, it is diﬃcult to see how Spinoza could assert any kind of
priority. The reason for this derives from his views on the relationship
between ideas of ideas, i.e., second-order ideas and ﬁrst-order ideas.
First-order ideas have bodies as their objects. Such ideas constitute our
knowledge of body. Second-order ideas have ideas as their objects.
Such ideas constitute our knowledge of mind. Spinoza says that
our second-order ideas have the same relationship to our ﬁrst-order
ideas as our ﬁrst-order ideas have to bodies. What kind of relationship
is this? First of all, it is not explanatory. Bodies do not explain our ideas of
bodies. If the relationship between second-order ideas and bodies is the
same as the relationship between ﬁrst-order ideas and bodies, then ﬁrst-
order ideas do not explain our second-order ideas. Second, ﬁrst-order
ideas and bodies are one and the same thing conceived under two
diﬀerent attributes. We must infer from this that second-order ideas
and ﬁrst-order ideas are one and the same thing conceived of diﬀerently
(although under the same attribute). And indeed Spinoza explicitly
aﬃrms this conclusion when he writes: “the idea of the idea, is nothing
but the form of the idea insofar as this is considered as a mode of thinking
without relation to the object.”20 In other words, second-order ideas are
identical to the ideas that they represent. First-order ideas thus represent
20 E2p21s.
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themselves and there is but a distinction of reason between them and
the second-order ideas that represent them.
Materialism, Idealism, and Monism
None of the candidates for the mark of the mental that we considered
have succeeded. Is this because we have been considering the wrong
candidates, or is there a deeper reason to be found in Spinoza’s
metaphysics of mind and body? In this section, I will argue that there
is a deeper reason: any explicit characterization or mark of one attribute
entails for Spinoza that the other attributes must lack such a mark on
pain of entailing forms of metaphysical dualism that Spinoza seeks to
avoid.
The precise nature of Spinoza’s metaphysics of mind and body is
a contentious issue with nearly every imaginable interpretation ﬁnding
adherents. A large number of commentators have thought that Spinoza
is a substance dualist.21 On this view, each attribute is itself a substance
and Spinoza is a monist only in the sense that mental and physical
substance compose to form a third substance and there is only one
such comprehensive substance. (Here as elsewhere I am ignoring the
complications introduced by Spinoza’s obscure doctrine of the unknown
attributes.) Still others allege that he is a materialist.22 There are those who
claim that he is an idealist or at least that his system pushes him in that
direction.23 Another popular interpretation is that he is a dual aspect
theorist or a property dualist.24
What are we to make of Spinoza’s capacity to attract a nearly exhaus-
tive array of mutually exclusive interpretations? It is almost enough to
make one suspect that Spinoza’s philosophy of mind must be nothing
more than an incoherent farrago of fragmentary doctrines out of which
almost any metaphysics of mind can be assembled. This is, I believe, not
the case, but nevertheless a truly successful interpretation of Spinoza’s
philosophy would explain how it manages to attract such diverse
interpretations.
21 Gueroult, Spinoza I, 232; Donagan, “Spinoza’s Dualism,” pp. 115–129.
22 Hampshire, “A Kind of Materialism,” pp. 5–23; Negri, The Savage Anomaly, p. 65 and 155; Montag,
Bodies, Masses, Power, p. 57.
23 Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, p. 260; Martineau, A Study of Spinoza, p. 189; Murray,
“The Idealism of Spinoza,” p. 474.
24 Bennett, A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics, p. 41; Della Rocca, Representation and the Mind-Body Problem,
chapter 9.
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Of all of these interpretations, I believe, the anti-dualist interpreta-
tions are closest to the mark.25 But Spinoza was neither a materialist nor
an idealist, at least not in the sense that one doctrine is supposed to
exclude the other. He is a metaphysical monist and a conceptual
dualist.26 For Spinoza, whether or not something is mental or physical
is a matter of how it is conceived. Moreover, anything can be accurately
and adequately conceived as mental or as physical. Under the mental way
of conceiving, the whole story of the world can be told truthfully
and without leaving anything out. Likewise, under the physical way of
conceiving, the whole story of the world can be told without leaving
anything out. Each attribute, in other words, is a diﬀerent way of
thinking about the same thing and its history.
This explains why Spinoza’s metaphysics of mind has been interpreted
in such multifarious ways. When the materialist gives her account of the
world, Spinoza is in a position to agree with all her particular claims. (But
not her universal generalizations like “There are no ideas.”) Likewise with
the idealist. Someone who observes Spinoza agreeing with both the mate-
rialist and the idealist might well conclude that, for him, both the physical
substance and the mental world are equally real. Hence substance dualism.
Alternatively, if emphasis is placed on the accuracy of perceiving the world
as both extended and thinking, then one is likely to conclude that Spinoza
is a property dualist.
Spinoza does think that extension and thinking are equally real, but not
because he is a metaphysical dualist. Rather, they are equally real because
they are the very same things or features conceived of diﬀerently.
For such a conceptual dualism to succeed, it must be the case that our
concepts of the attributes are individuated in such a way that they imply no
metaphysical diﬀerence in the world. How is this possible? They cannot be
individuated by their contents because they have the same contents. It is
thus natural to think that they must then be individuated by how those
contents are presented. How are we to think of modes of presentation in
this context? It is common for philosophers after Frege to think of modes
of presentation descriptively. For example, the content of the name
“Hesperus” might be presented under the description “the brightest star
25 I develop and defend this interpretation in my “Spinoza on the Metaphysics of Thought and
Extension,” in the Cambridge Companion to Spinoza, forthcoming.
26 The idea that the distinction between the attributes is merely a distinctio rationis goes back to at least
Wolfson, but it is decidedly more popular among non-specialists than specialists. See, e.g., Heil,
Philosophy of Mind, p. 185.
98 martin lin
3!B697#B7D7B!C#8(C73)3 3 73D:DD$C*** 53!B697 #B95#B7D7B!C :DD$C6# #B9 
 	
.#*" #36768B#!:DD$C*** 53!B697 #B95#B7 ,#CD#"2")7BCD+1:7# #9+0B3B+#"/("3DC(75DD#D:7
in the evening sky” and the content of the name “Phosphorus” under the
description “the brightest star in the morning sky.”
But the individuation of modes of presentation by associated description
entails metaphysical diﬀerence. That Venus has two such modes of pre-
sentation requires that it also has two distinct properties: it must have the
property of being the brightest star in the morning sky and it must have the
property of being the brightest star in the evening sky. Otherwise it would
not satisfy both descriptions.27 For this reason, mental concepts and
physical concepts cannot be individuated by descriptive modes of presen-
tation for Spinoza. If they were, the objects to which they apply would
need to have diﬀerent properties by virtue of which they satisﬁed the
distinct modes of presentation, and this would undermine Spinoza’s
monism.28 What Spinoza needs instead are modes of presentation that
are not individuated descriptively.
This helps us to understand why we have not been able to identify
a mark of the mental that is compatible with Spinoza’s system. All of the
attributes are on par. They must be treated symmetrically. Thus the
mental is substantively characterized just in case the physical is substan-
tively characterized. Any substantive characterization of the mental that
can serve to distinguish it from the physical would entail that substance
satisﬁes two descriptions: the mark of the mental and the mark of the
physical. This in turn would entail a metaphysical distinction between
properties.
We have so far neglected the attribute of extension. I have claimed that
Spinoza must not substantively characterize it on pain of dualism. Is this
borne out by Spinoza’s philosophy? The term extension suggests Euclidean
three-dimensional space. If the attribute of extension were Euclidean
space, then a substantive characterization of it would be available in
terms of something like the axioms and deﬁnitions of Euclid’s’ Elements.
But there are many reasons that suggest such an interpretation would be
incorrect. For example, in his correspondence, Spinoza denies that his
conception of extension is the same as Descartes’ and he asserts that it
must have a dynamic aspect.29 Clearly this does not describe Euclidean
three-dimensional space. What, then, is extension? Spinoza is appropri-
ately silent.
27 See Smart, “Sensations and Brain Processes,” p. 148. Smart attributes this point to Max Black.
28 Although we both think that the diﬀerence between the attributes is merely conceptual, I reject Noa
Shein’s interpretation in her “The False Dichotomy Between Objective and Subjective
Interpretations of Spinoza’s Attributes,” pp. 529–531, for this reason.
29 Ep. 83; see also 1p16, 1p16d.
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What leads Spinoza to postulate a conceptual dualism between mind
and body in the ﬁrst place? Why not rest content with some kind of
more straightforward monism, for example, materialism or idealism?
It is impossible to say with certainty, as Spinoza never addresses the
question. He more or less simply asserts his dualism and then explores
some of its consequences. Perhaps this starting point can be accounted
for by the fact that Spinoza wanted to explain why various forms of
dualism have dominated Western philosophy, beginning with ancients
like Plato and running through the history of the Latin West in the form
of Christian Aristotelians (who were indeed dualist even if not Cartesian
dualists).30 His explanation is that we are equipped with two sets of
concepts that bear no a priori connections to one another. Because they
lack such connections, philosophers have taken them to apply to very
diﬀerent kinds of objects or to express very diﬀerent kinds of properties.
In reality, according to Spinoza, they are nothing but the products of
conceptual redundancy.
Spinoza tries to oﬀer an explanation of this conceptual redundancy,
but his answer is far from satisfactory. In order to remain tolerably close
to Spinoza’s own formulation of his reasons, we must now drop the
pretense that thought and extension are the only two attributes. I have
been speaking of Spinoza’s conceptual “dualism,” but, strictly speaking,
he is no dualist. Rather he is a conceptual pluralist of a rather extreme
variety. He believes that there are inﬁnitely many attributes but, for
some reason, thought and extension are the only two known by us.
The underlying justiﬁcation for this claim seems to be the thought
expressed in E1p9: the more reality something has, the more attributes
it has. God is the most real being possible. Therefore, God has inﬁnitely
many attributes. But the conclusion does not follow from the premises.
The most we ought to conclude is that God has every possible attribute.
It does not appear that this line of reasoning could tell us how many
possible attributes there are.
This does not mean that I think Spinoza’s position is completely
unmotivated. The observation that metaphysical dualism is widespread is
certainly correct and just as certainly calls out for explanation. Inferring
metaphysical diﬀerence from merely conceptual diﬀerence is a very pro-
mising explanation of this putative error.
30 See Rozemond, Descartes’ Dualism, pp. 38–41.
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Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued that Spinoza provides us with no mark of the
mental and, indeed, all of the most promising candidates for the mark of
the mental are not even compatible with the explicitly stated commitments
of Spinoza’s philosophy. I have further argued that these incompatibilities
are entailed by Spinoza’s monism. Both extension and thought cannot be
substantively characterized on pain of metaphysical dualism.
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